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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF POLYGAMY
PROHIBITIONS AFTER LAWRENCE V.TEXAS: IS
SCALIA A PUNCHLINE OR A PROPHET?
JOSEPH BOZZUTIt
"[ W]e have no government armed with power capable of contending
with human passions unbridled by morality and religion.... Our
Constitution was made only for a moral and religiouspeople. It is wholly
inadequateto the government of any other. "1
INTRODUCTION

Associate Justice Antonin Scalia has been labeled the Supreme
Court's "most notorious dissenter."2
Among the high Court's most
conservative members, 3 his emotionally charged dissenting opinions have,
on more than one occasion, evoked firestorms of controversy.4 Indeed, it
is safe to say that a large segment of the populace will not soon describe
themselves as Scalia devotees. Many observers, however, admire Scalia's
unfeigned, straightforward approach to jurisprudence. 6 Scalia is "the
I B.A., 2001, State University of New York at Binghamton; J.D., 2004, St. John's
University School of Law.
1 Letter from John Adams to the Officers of the First Brigade of the Third Division of the
Militia of Massachusetts (Oct. 11, 1798), in 9 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, at 229 (Charles
Francis Adams ed., 1854).
2 Michael Frost, Rhetorical Question: What Would Aristotle Make of
Scalia?, LEGAL AFF.,
Nov.-Dec. 2003, at 26.
3 See, e.g., Jonathan Ringel, Bar Inductees Get Candid Glimpse of Supreme Court, THE
RECORDER (Atlanta), Sept. 17, 2003, at 7 (describing the Court's liberals as Justices Ginsburg,
Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, and naming Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas
as its conservatives). Justices Kennedy and O'Connor are considered the swing voters, though
Justice Kennedy has, of late, sided predominantly with the Court's majority. See id.
4 As a conservative-minded jurist, Justice Scalia often espouses views that are at odds
with
America's social norms. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 346-49 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part); PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 691-705 (2001)
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636-53 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
5 See, e.g., Sally K. Hilander, The 1998 Convention: Justice Scalia Debunks the "Living
Constitution" Theory, 24 MONT. LAW. 1, 33 (Oct. 1998) ("Scalia's critics have been diverse and
numerous. Their basic complaint is his originalist ideas tend to freeze the Constitution in time,
rather than allowing it to speak to contemporary needs, all of which Scalia freely admits.").
6 Scalia even has his own fan club, which has taken to the World Wide Web. See Cult of
Scalia, at http://members.aol.com/schwenkler/scalia (1996) (last visited Oct. 2, 2004)
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veritable personification of the desire to leave legislating to legislators." 7
He believes that the Supreme Court should not stray from the
Constitution's mandate. 8 Staying true to this philosophy, Scalia says what
others are arguably afraid to say. Often, the ideas he conveys are
unpopular
and out of sync with our nation's politically correct social
9
posture.
In the high Court's landmark decision Lawrence v. Texas,10 the
justices overruled Bowers v. Hardwickl l and held that homosexuals enjoy1 a2
constitutionally protected right to engage in private intimate conduct.
Justice Scalia's dissent was very critical of the majority opinion' 3 and
predicted that the scope of the Court's ruling left all morals-based
legislation vulnerable to attack.' 4 Specifically, Scalia predicted that state
laws against same-sex marriage, bestiality, and bigamy, among other

("Overcome by unadulterated awe, we, the votaries of perhaps the greatest jurist of our time,
have taken wholeheartedly to the net, that he might be more widely known and appreciated.").
7 Michael R. Dimino, Pay No Attention to That Man Behind the Robe: Judicial Elections,
the First Amendment, and Judges as Politicians, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 301, 360 n.355
(2003).
8 See, e.g., Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 681 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Today's
imposition upon the States finds justification neither in the text of the Constitution, nor in the
settled practices of our people, nor in the prior jurisprudence of this Court. I respectfully
dissent."). See generally Shawn Burton, Justice Scalia's Methodological Approach to Judicial
Decision-Making: Political Actor or Strategic Institutionalist?, 34 U. TOL. L. REV. 575, 575
(2003) ("Justice Scalia has generated a vigorous dialogue regarding his self-proclaimed approach
to judicial decision-making. Textual originalism and the enunciation of clear rules of law, Justice
Scalia proclaims, are the only appropriate ways to uncover and effectuate the true principles of
the United States Constitution.").
9 Occasionally, Scalia's ideology puts him at odds with even his fellow conservative
justices. One commentator observed:
Justice Scalia writes passionately, artfully, and sharply. His wit is often barbed and his
criticism scathing. He also tends to aim his sharpest and most vocal denunciations not
at those more liberal members on the Court with whom he disagrees routinely, but
instead at those more conservative members of the Court whenever they fail to live up
to Scalia's own conservative standards. He openly ridicules their legal reasoning, casts
doubt on their morality, and even sometimes appears to call into question both their
intellectual capacity and personal integrity.
Richard J. Lazarus, Rehnquist's Court, 47 ST. Louis U. L.J. 861, 871 (2003).
10 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruledby Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
12 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 ("The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private
lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private
sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full
right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government.").
13 See id. at 603 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("What Texas has chosen to do is well within the
range of traditional democratic action, and its hand should not be stayed through the invention of
a brand-new 'constitutional right' by a Court that is impatient of democratic change.").
14 See id. at 589-92.
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things, were "called into question" by the Court's expansive decision.' 5
This remains to be seen. Recently, however, the storm that Scalia
forecasted has undoubtedly reared
its ugly head in the latest challenge to
16
Utah's prohibition of polygamy.
Identified only as J. Bronson, D. Cook, and G. Lee Cook, three
Utahans brought suit challenging the constitutionality of Utah's polygamy
statute.17 On December 22, 2003, plaintiffs J. Bronson and G. Lee Cook
sought a marriage license from the Salt Lake County's elected clerk,
defendant Sherrie Swensen.18 They did so for the purpose of entering into
a plural marriage, one "similar to that practiced in the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints in Utah prior to 1890."'19 The clerk's office
denied the license, because plaintiff G. Lee Cook's application indicated
that he was already legally married. 20 G. Lee Cook then orally notified a
state clerk and Swensen's co-defendant, Val Rasmussen, of the fact that he
wished to marry J. Bronson as his second lawful wife. 2' Rasmussen and
her supervisor, co-defendant Lorie 22
Tafoya, refused to violate Utah law to
provide the plaintiffs with a license.
In Utah, polygamy is constitutionally and statutorily prohibited. In
fact, the State's entrance into the Union was conditioned on outlawing the
practice.23 Article II, Section 1 of Utah's constitution reads as follows:
Perfect toleration of religious sentiment is guaranteed. No inhabitant of
this State shall ever be molested in person or property on account of his
or her mode of reliious worship; but polygamous or plural marriages are
forever prohibited.

1" See id. at 590.
16 See generally Leonard Post, Lawyers Square Off Over Polygamy Case:Scalia's Dissent

in the Texas Sodomy Case is Echoed in a Utah Action, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 26, 2004, at 4 ("Scalia
may have sounded like Chicken Little to some. But a challenge to the law against polygamy in
Utah may change skeptics' minds.").
17 See id.
'8See generally Complaint of J. Bronson, G. Lee Cook, and D. Cook, Bronson v. Swensen,
(D. Utah 2004) (No. 02:04-CV-0021) [hereinafter "Complaint"].
19See Complaint at 3-4,
12-15 ("The sincere and deeply held religious beliefs of J.
Bronson, D. Cook, and G. Lee Cook are that the doctrine of plural marriage, i.e., a man having
more than one wife, is ordained of God and is to be encouraged and practiced.").
20 See Complaint at 4-5, 1 19-24 (noting also that the plaintiffs paid
the fifty dollar
application fee).
21 See Complaint at 4, 21.
22 See Complaint at 5,
23-24.
23 See Utah Enabling Act, UTAH CODE ANN §§ 1, 3 (1991). The Act provided "[tihat the
inhabitants of all that part of the area of the United States now constituting the Territory of Utah,
as at present described, may become the State of Utah ....[p]rovided, [t]hat polygamous or
plural marriages are forever prohibited." Id.
24 UTAH CONST. art. III, § 1.
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Moreover, the Utah Criminal Code, in pertinent part, provides as
follows:
(1) A person is guilty of bigamy when, knowing he has a husband or wife
or knowing the other person has a husband or wife, the person purports to
marry another person or cohabits
with another person.
25
(2) Bigamy is a felony of the third degree.
In addition, another statute criminalizes the activity of any state clerks
26
who knowingly provide marriage licenses for prohibited marriages.
Thus, Rasmussen, Tafoya, and Swensen's conduct was well within their
lawful duties as state employees.
The plaintiffs' complaint states three causes of action. First, the
plaintiffs assert that the defendants' conduct violated their rights under the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.27 Next, they claim that the
"defendants have improperly limited and restricted [their] right to intimate
expression and association., 28 Finally, they maintain that defendants
29
violated their right to privacy "with regard to private, intimate matters.,
For this proposition, the plaintiffs cited the Supreme Court's Lawrence v.
Texas decision. 30 Plaintiffs are seeking declaratory relief, claiming that the
above provision of the Utah Constitution and the above statute proscribing
polygamy violate the United States Constitution. 3 They also seek nominal
damages in the amount of one dollar.3 2 The case is captioned Bronson v.
Swensen and is venued in the United States District Court for the District
of Utah.33
This Note employs the Bronson v. Swensen case as the backdrop for
an examination into the constitutionality of polygamy after Lawrence v.
25 UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-101 (2003).
26 See id. § 30-1-16 (1998).

Every clerk or deputy clerk who knowingly issues a license for any prohibited
marriage shall be punished by confinement in the state prison for a term not exceeding
two years, or by fine in any sum not exceeding $1,000, or by both such fine and
imprisonment, and upon conviction shall be removed from his office by the judgment
of the court before which his conviction is had; and if he willfully issues a license
contrary to his duty as herein prescribed, he shall be fined not exceeding $1,000.
Id.

27 See Complaint at 7,
37 ("The conduct of defendants violated the First Amendment to
the United States Constitution in that defendants have improperly limited and restricted
plaintiffs' rights and ability to fulfill and practice a major tenet of their religion.").
28 See Complaint at 7, 40.
29 See Complaint at 8,
43 (asserting that defendants violated rights protected "by the First,

Fourteenth, and other Amendments to the United States Constitution").
30 See Complaint at 8,
43.
31 See Complaint at 8, Relief 1.
32 See Complaint at 8-9, Relief 2.
33 See Complaint at 1-2, TT 3-4.
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Texas. Part I of this Note provides a brief glimpse into the practice of
polygamy as practiced by Mormon fundamentalists and looks at the
historical criminalization of the practice. Part II, in turn, summarizes the
Lawrence decision, critiquing both Justice Kennedy's majority opinion and
Justice Scalia's dissent. Part III then analyzes polygamy prohibitions in
light of Lawrence and the Supreme Court's current approach to substantive
due process. An examination of polygamy prohibitions under current free
exercise jurisprudence is beyond the scope of this Note. In sum, Part III
explains why polygamy statutes need not be overturned after Lawrence.
This Note concludes, however, that the Lawrence decision may very well
have left all morals-based legislation vulnerable to constitutional attack.
Courts must now look beyond mere assertions of moral propriety before
upholding legislation.
I. FUNDAMENTAL MORMONISM AND CRIMINALIZATION OF POLYGAMY: A
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

This section discusses the Mormon religion and its evolution within
American society. Likewise, it traces the criminalization of polygamous
practices from before Utah entered the Union until today. The seminal
Supreme Court case dealing with polygamy prohibition, Reynolds v.
United States,3 4 will be discussed at length. In Reynolds, the Court
affirmed a criminal conviction of a Mormon for practicing polygamy,
holding that outlawing polygamous conduct did not violate the
Constitution's Free Exercise Clause.3 5
A. Who are the Mormons?
Although it was considered offensive during the 1800s, it has become
common practice to refer to members of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints as "Mormons. ' 36 The birth of Mormonism stems from,
as the stories go, several visions and revelations of Joseph Smith.37 Smith

34 98 U.S. 145 (1878).

35 See id. at 166-67 ("To permit [plural marriage] would be to make the professed doctrines
of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become
a law unto himself.").
36 See Sarah Barringer Gordon, A War of Words: Revelation and Storytelling in the
Campaign Against Mormon Polygamy, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 739, 739 n. 1 (2003) (stating that
"[n]o disparagement is intended" by referring to the members of the Latter-day Saints Church as
Mormons).
37 See James W. Gordon, Religion and the First Justice Harlan:A Case Study in Late
Nineteenth Century Presbyterian Constitutionalism, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 317, 403 (2001)
("Mormon founder Joseph Smith claimed to have received a divine revelation supplementing the
Bible....").
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first received a visit from God and Jesus Christ, whereupon he was told
"that he should not join any existing church, but should be God's agent to
restore the true Church of Christ.

' 38

Subsequently, Smith purportedly

received a visit from the angel Moroni who informed him that he should
"unearth and translate a holy book written on plates of gold. 3 9 The plates
contained the religious text of America's ancient prophets. 40 Three years
later, Smith completed this translation-the finished product being the
Book of Mormon, the Church's great scripture.4 1 It then became Smith's
obligation to restore the Church as he was commanded.42
Thus, in 1829, John the Baptist visited Smith and gave him the
authority of a priest. 43 This was followed by visits from other apostles

who bestowed upon Smith similar grants of authority. 44 With 4his
5
newfound power, Smith formally founded the Mormon Church in 1830.
Joseph Smith was killed in 1844 at the age of thirty-eight.46 During
the time between his founding of Mormonism and his death, Smith was

38

See Religion and Ethics: Mormonism, British Broadcasting Corp., at http://www.bbc.co.

uk/religion/religions/mormon/history/history3.shtml (last visited Oct. 2, 2004) [hereinafter "BBC
Mormonism"]. The British Broadcasting Corporation's informational site is akin to an
encyclopedia and was instrumental in the author's research for this Note. Since the website has
static URLs, the author will cite to the URLs as he would normally cite to page numbers.
39 Id.; see Mary K. Campbell, Mr. Peay 's Horses: The Federal Response to Mormon
Polygamy, 1854-1887, 13 YALE J.L. & FEMtNISM 29, 34 (2001) ("Smith translated Moroni's
plates into The Book of Mormon. This translation did nothing less than provide America with a
pre-Columbian history completely independent of Europe.").
40 See BBC Mormonism, at http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/mormon/history/
history3.shtml.
41 See Keith E. Sealing, Polygamists Out of the Closet: Statutory and State Constitutional
ProhibitionsAgainst Polygamy Are Unconstitutional Under the Free Exercise Clause, 17 GA.
ST. U. L. REV. 691, 701-02 (2001) ("The plates, translated by Smith into King James versionstyle English, became the Book of Mormon, describing the pre-Columbian American Indians as
being of Hebrew origin and as being the chosen people in the promised land of America."); see
also Scott v. Hammock, 133 F.R.D. 610, 611 n.l (D. Utah 1990) ("[T]he religious Book of
Mormon ... is an authoritative doctrinal and historical text of the Church.").
42 See BBC Mormonism, at http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/mormon/history/
history3.shtml ("Joseph set about building the restored church, continuing to receive direct
guidance from God on how to do it.").
43 Id.
44 id
45 See Todd M. Gillett, Note, The Absolution of Reynolds: The Constitutionality of
Religious Polygamy, 8 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 497, 503 (2000) ("On April 6, 1830, Joseph
Smith, Jr., a twenty-four-year-old farmer, founded the religious community that became the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.").
46 BBC Mormonism, at http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/mormon/history/history3.
shtml.
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badly persecuted and jailed countless times.4 7 Church membership,
however, grew from six to twenty-six thousand during Smith's life.4 8
The persecution suffered by Joseph Smith was common among other
Mormons. 49 This led Smith's successor as the Mormon's leader, Brigham
Young, to organize a migration of Mormons to America's west-beyond
what was the United States' physical border at that time. 50 The Mormons
eventually settled in the Great Salt Lake Basin in 1847.51 Their migration
was not easy, but it was necessary to escape their widespread
persecution.5 2 Mormons were severely discriminated against on account
of, among other things, their refusal to keep slaves and their belief in plural
Salt Lake City became, and remains, the nerve center
marriages.53 Thus,
54
of Mormonism.

As in other Christian religions, Christ is the central figure in the
Mormon Church. Nonetheless, significant differences exist between
47

Id.

48

Id.; see also Kamron Keele, A Plea for the Repeal of Section 107: No More Tax-Free

Mansionsfor Dubious "Ministersof the Gospel", 56 TAX LAW. 73, 97 (2002) ("There are some
4.8 million Mormons in the United States... and some 4.9 million adherents abroad. The
Mormon Church has a robust annual growth rate of 4.7% in the United States and nearly double
that abroad. Some have estimated that Mormon Church membership worldwide should reach 260
million in 80 years.").
49 See Senator Gordon Smith, Protecting the Weak: Religious Liberty in the Twenty-First
Century, 1999 BYU L. REV. 479, 492-93 (1999). Senator Smith commented:
[T]he Mormons... were subjected to persecution early in their history "because their
ideas and ways differed so greatly from the customary." The Mormons were antislavery in Missouri at a time before the Civil War, when tensions on this issue ran to
the extreme. This created severe problems for the group, which was forced to leave
Missouri under attack from serious mob violence and an "extermination order" from
the governor of the state. Smith was subsequently murdered by a mob in 1844; in
order to escape their enemies, the Mormons fled westward across the great plains to
present-day Utah, where they have prospered to the present day.
Id.; see also Timothy Egan, The Persistence of Polygamy, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 28, 1999, at
53-54 (stating that Mormons have been persecuted since their founding).
50 See BBC Mormonism, at http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/mormon/history/histor
y4.shtml ("After Smith's death the new Church leader, Brigham Young... decided that their
future lay in the American West. He decided that the people would emigrate en-masse. It would
be a migration like that of the Israelites who had been forced to leave Egypt in search of the
Promised Land.").
"1 See id.
52

See id.

53 See id.; see also Note, Wagering on Religious Liberty, 116 HARV. L. REV. 946, 949

(2003) ("[T]he Mormons were ... subject to massive and brutal persecution by state authorities
and the federal government precisely because they deviated from the Protestant norm.").
54 See Dennis Moore, What's Buzzing About Olympic Host, USA TODAY, Feb. 10, 2002, at
10 ("The Utah population, 2.25 million, is approximately 70% Mormon. However, the Mormon
makeup of Salt Lake City, population 181,743, is slightly less than half."); BBC Mormonism, at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/mormon/history/history4.shtml.
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Mormonism and other more widespread religions. 5 "Mormons believe
their church is a restoration of the Church as conceived by Jesus and that
the other Christian churches have gone astray., 56 Marriage and family are
central to Mormon life. In fact, Mormons believe it is their religious
obligation to have children; therefore, many have children while still
relatively young. 57 Likewise, marriage is fundamental in the Mormon
Church-Mormons believe that they must be married to reach the ultimate
salvation in the afterlife. 58 Mormons additionally subscribe to the practice
of tithing, giving one-tenth of their annual income to the Church. 59
One significant tenet of the Mormon faith is the widespread service of
its membership in missionary activities and broad-spectrum compassion
for other human beings. 60 Approximately forty percent of young Mormon
men complete missionary service, typically serving for two years
beginning at age nineteen. 61 Women most often carry out eighteen months
of missionary service, but their service is not founded in the same religious
compulsion as their male counterparts. 62 Mormons are encouraged to
complete missionary service as an analog to tithing. Their missionary
service amounts to a "tithe" on a period of twenty years of their lives.63
Today, there are over eleven million practicing Mormons worldwide,
with nearly five million in the United States, and these numbers are
55 See BBC Mormonism, at http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/mormon/intro.shtml
(Mormonism "has substantial differences in belief to the Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox
Christian Churches.").
56 id.
57 See id. at http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/mormon/customs/family.shtml

("Mormon parents regard it as their duty (and of course as a source of great joy) to have children
in order to create physical bodies for spirits to come to earth in order to fulfil [sic] God's plan.").
58 See id at http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/mormon/features/rites/marriage.shtml
("Mormons also believe that marriage is part of the plan of salvation. They see it as essential for
exaltation, and believe that unmarried people cannot reach the highest level of the Celestial
Kingdom after their death.").
59 See Keele, supra note 48, at 97 (noting that Mormons tithe approximately 5.2 billion
dollars per year to the Church).
60 See Campbell, supra note 39, at 34 n.43. Campbell discussed Mormon benevolence:
"Good works" is not a hollow concept in most Mormon communities. Quick to
ridicule Mormonism for polygamy and missionaries, popular culture often looses [sic]
sight of Mormons' tremendous willingness to care for one another. The Church's
formal welfare system is without parallel in the U.S., and this community ethic trickles
down through Mormon society as a whole. A member experiencing financial or
familial problems can expect a wide range of support, including everything from
childcare to housing to substantial monetary assistance.
Id.
61 See BBC Mormonism, at http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/mormon/features/
mission.shtml.
62
63

Id.
Id.
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Although figures vary considerably, a
increasing dramatically.64
conservative estimate places the number of polygamists in America at
around 30,000. 65 Mormons practicing polygamy are typically called
"Mormon fundamentalists." 66 The next section will discuss Mormon
fundamentalism and the practice of polygamy during the nineteenth
century and today as well as look at the criminalization of polygamy in our
nation.
B. Mormon Polygamy

Polygamy, also known as plural marriage, is the "state of being
simultaneously married to more than one spouse. 67 The practice became
an official tenet of the Mormon Church in 1852.68 Although renounced
today, 69 the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints endorsed
polygamy until 1890.70 Joseph Smith himself began practicing polygamy
in 1841 . 71 At first, there was public outcry and confusion among Mormons
about polygamy, but Smith "resolved the confusion by announcing the
receipt of two revelations. 72 This announcement, in a sense, legitimized

64 See id. at http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/mormon/intro.shtml; see also John
Kincaid, Extinguishing the Twin Relics of Barbaric Multiculturalism-Slaveryand PolygamyFrom American Federalism, 33 PUBLIUS 75, 81 (2003) (announcing that "if current worldwide
rates of conversion are sustained through this century, by 2100 the Mormon Church will be the
second largest Christian denomination (after the Roman Catholic Church) and the first major
world faith established since Mohammed founded Islam 1,400 years ago").
65 See BBC Mormonism at http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/mormon/features/

polygamy.shtml ("There are said to be over 30,000 people practising [sic] polygamy in Utah,
Idaho, Montana and Arizona, who either regard themselves as preserving the original Mormon
beliefs and customs, or have merely adopted polygamy as a desired way of life and not as part of
the teachings of any church.").
66 See generally Irwin Altman, Polygamous Family Life: The Case of Contemporary
Mormon Fundamentalists, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 367, 369 (1996) (examining modem Mormon
fundamentalism).
67 BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1180 (7th ed. 1999).
68 See Altman, supra note 66, at 368.
69 See, e.g., Elizabeth Harmer-Dionne, Once a PeculiarPeople: Cognitive Dissonance and

the Suppression of Mormon Polygamy As a Case-Study Negating the Belief-Action Distinction,
50 STAN. L. REv. 1295, 1336 (1998) ("Mormons now define themselves in opposition to
polygamy rather than in conjunction with it.... For decades, polygamy has been, as it continues
to be, an offense meriting excommunication.").
70 See Altman, supra note 66, at 369 (explaining that "the Mormon church succumbed to
governmental pressures and first rejected the practice of polygyny in 1890").
71 See L. Rex Sears, Punishingthe Saints for Their "PeculiarInstitution": Congress on the
ConstitutionalDilemmas, 2001 UTAH L. REv. 581, 587 (2001) ("Joseph Smith may have first
attempted to practice plural marriage in 1833, but it was not until 1841 that he began to establish
the practice in a more permanent fashion, secretly introducing the practice among a number of
his close associates in high Church office over the next several years.").
72 Harmer-Dionne, supranote 69, at 1320.

THE CA THOLIC LAWYER

[Vol.43:409

the practice. One commentator summarized the historical view of
Mormonism towards polygamy as follows:
Mormons endowed polygamy with unprecedented moral attributes
by incorporating it into their eschatology. Perhaps the most
radical doctrinal tenet of Mormonism is that mankind can achieve
godhood and that God himself was once a mere mortal. The
Prophet Joseph Smith explicitly taught that a man would progress
through eternity in proportion to the magnitude of his posterity on
earth and that polygamy was a central part of the pursuit of
godhood. More wives ensured both increased progeny and greater
future glory. Men who rejected the practice of polygamy not only
forfeited godhood, but were damned. Accordingly, the salvation
of women depended on their
union with a righteous-by
73
definition, polygamous-man.
In light of this, it is understandable why many members of the Mormon
Church felt obligated to practice polygamy during the 1800s.
Nineteenth century Mormons' belief in polygamy put the Territory of
Utah at odds with our young nation. Thus, in 1862, Congress passed the
Morrill Act, which criminalized polygamous practices within the United
States' Territories. 74 "The leaders of the Mormon Church held the reins of
political power in the Territory and the possibility that the Territory would
come into the Union as a state in which polygamous marriage was legal
was on the minds of those in the federal government., 75 Thereafter, in
1882, Congress enacted The Edmunds Act, which made "cohabitation a
crime and prohibit[ed] polygamists and polygamist sympathizers from
76
sitting on juries or holding public office."
Needless to say, the laws of the late nineteenth century were sternly
aligned against the Mormons and polygamy. Congress' Edmunds-Tucker
Act of 1887 epitomizes the federal government's opposition to
Mormonism at this time. 77 This Act "required plural wives to testify
against their husbands, erased the loan institution that helped members of
the Mormon Church immigrate to the United States from Europe, and
provided a mechanism for the government to acquire property of the
Church., 78 Feeling a sense of defeat, Utah entered the Union in 1894 on
71 Id. at 1319-20.
74 See The Morrill Act, § 1, Pub. L. No. 37-126, 12 Stat. 501, 501 (1862)
(repealed 1910);

Maura Strassberg, The Crime of Polygamy, 12 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REv. 353, 353 (2003).
75 Strassberg, supra note 74, at 353.
76 See id; see also id. at 353 n.5.
77 The Edmunds-Tucker Act, ch. 397, §§ 13, 17, 24 Stat. 635, 637, 638 (1887); See
Stephanie Forbes, Comment, "Why Just Have One? ": An Evaluation of the Anti-Polygamy Laws
Under the Establishment Clause, 39 Hous. L. REv. 1517, 1524 (2003).
78 Forbes, supra note 77, at 1524.
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the condition that polygamous practices were forever forbidden. 79 This
came four years after the Church's official renouncement of the practice.8 °
Nonetheless, the so-called Mormon fundamentalists breathed new life
into polygamy during the 1930s and 1940s. 81 These groups exist even
today, residing primarily in the western United States, as well as small
portions of northern Mexico and southern Canada. Much to the disdain
of the mainstream Mormon Church, which excommunicates those
espousing polygamous views, 83 Mormon fundamentalists believe in
practicing Mormonism as Joseph Smith did during the mid-nineteenth
century.84 Thus, in Bronson v. Swensen, the plaintiffs' complaint reads: "A
sincere and deeply held religious major tenet of the beliefs of J. Bronson,
D. Cook and G. Lee Cook is the practice of plural marriage similar to that
practiced in the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints in Utah prior to
"
189o. 385
Today, polygamy is outlawed throughout the United States.86 For
many years, however, there has been considerable controversy over the
lack of enforcement. 87 Very often law enforcement officials feel that their
resources are better spent elsewhere. But, the trial and conviction of Utah
polygamist Tom Green88 and Salt Lake City's hosting of the 2002 Winter
Olympics certainly brought polygamy to the forefront of American social
debates. 89 This recent media attention, however, pales in comparison to

79 See Utah Enabling Act, UTAH CODE ANN §§ 1, 3 (1991).
80 See supra note 69-70 and accompanying text.
81 Altman, supra note 66, at 369; Strassberg, supra note 74, at
354.
82 See Strassberg, supra note 74, at 354 (specifying that today's
Mormon fundamentalists
reside mainly in "small isolated rural communities in Arizona, Utah, Montana and Idaho").
83 See supra note 69.
g4 See Altman, supra note 66, at 370 (stating that "fundamentalists consider themselves to
be Mormons and the 'true' followers of Joseph Smith and original church theology").
85 See Complaint at 3, 13.
86 See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878) (holding
that religious beliefs
are no defense to polygamy). But see Gillett, supra note 45, at 508 (noting that Native Americans
are allowed to practice polygamy "according to their customs").
87 See Strassberg, supra note 74, at 354. The state of Utah, however,
has taken strides in
recent years to increase enforcement. See, e.g., Utah Senate Approves Bill To Fight Polygamist
Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2000, at A12 ("Polygamy, a third-degree felony, is rarely
prosecuted because many of the marriages, while performed in a church, are not registered with

the authorities.").
88 Green's prosecution was Utah's first polygamy trial in fifty years. See Ryan D. Tenney,
Tom Green, Common-Law Marriage,and the Illegality of PutativePolygamy, 17 BYU J. PUB. L.
141, 142 (2002) (criticizing Green's bigamy conviction); Pauline Arrillaga, PuttingPolygamy on
Trial in Utah, WASH. POST, Dec. 8, 2000, at A49 (providing background on Green's family and
prosecution).
89 See Katharine Biele, Tiptoeing Out to Meet the World, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 3, 2002, § 4, at
15 ("Although polygamy is no longer allowed within the Mormon Church and the relatively few
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the pandemonium surrounding the potential entrance of the polygamyfriendly state into the Union during the late 1800s. The next section will
discuss the Supreme Court's decision in Reynolds v. United States,90 which
arose in that context. Reynolds is the last time the Supreme Court spoke
on the issue of polygamy.
C. Reynolds v. United States
Reynolds v. United States was commenced as a challenge to the
Morrill Act, which outlawed polygamy in the Territories of the United
States. The case was decided on free exercise grounds but remains
relevant to this Note for two key reasons. First, Reynolds is the backdrop
of any challenge to anti-polygamy legislation. 91 Although "ancient," it,
nonetheless, is the seminal Supreme Court precedent in this area, and it
must be overcome in any contemporary challenge.9 2 Second, any
challenge to polygamy prohibitions based upon the right to privacy would
arguably be bolstered by its foundation in religious beliefs.93 In Reynolds,
the Court spoke directly on the topics of religion and morality. Therefore,
although a detailed analysis of the Free Exercise Clause is beyond the
scope of this Note, this section will discuss briefly the Reynolds decision,
which upheld the constitutionality of anti-polygamy legislation.
George Reynolds was a member of the Mormon Church.94 He was
convicted of bigamy in violation of the Morrill Act, which criminalized all95
persons "having a husband or wife living, who marries another."
polygamists who live here have splintered off on their own, that hasn't stopped the
wisecracks .... ").
" 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
34-35 ("Plaintiffs give notice that the case of Reynolds v.
91 See, e.g., Complaint at 7,
United States, if followed in this case, would summarily resolve plaintiff claims.... Plaintiffs
seek a review and overturning of that decision in light of more recent decisions by the United
States Supreme Court.").
92 See Kenneth W. Starr, Liberty and Equality Under the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment, 1993 BYU L. REv. 1, 2 (1993) (criticizing those justices who invoke such
antiquated precedent as Reynolds v. United States).
93 See, e.g., Steven Morris, Unleashing the Wave: Lawrence Decision Raises More Legal
Questions, 12 TEX. TRIANGLE ONLINE 1, at http://www.txtriangle.com/archive/1217/topstories
.htm (posted Jan. 29, 2004) (quoting BYU Law School Professor Richard Wilkins as stating that,
"[i]f you can't require monogamy, how in the world can you deny the claims of the polygamists,
particularly when it's buttressed by the claim of religion?").
94 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 161 (explaining that Reynolds was a Mormon and procured his
second marriage under the authority of the Church).
95 See id. at 146 (noting that the fine for bigamy was up to $500 and that it was an offense
punishable by up to five year in jail); see also ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE,
CRIMINAL LAW 458 (3d ed. 1982) ("Polygamy (many marriages) is employed at times as a
synonym of bigamy and at other times to indicate the simultaneous marriage of two or more
spouses.").
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Reynolds argued that his taking of a second wife was a legitimate tenet of
his religion.96 Therefore, he claimed that he should not lawfully be
punished for his conduct. 97 The Court was then faced with the question of
whether the Constitution's Free Exercise Clause forbade Congress from
enacting this legislation, or, in other words, whether Reynolds' criminal
guilt could be overcome by his religious justification.98
In reaching its conclusion, the Court extensively reviewed the rich
history of debate among the Founding Fathers as to what type of religious
freedom, if any, our citizens should be afforded. 99 The Court noted that
the upshot of these debates was the enactment of the First Amendment, by
which "Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion,
but was left free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or
subversive of good order."' 0 0 The Court then found that polygamy
prohibitions fell into the latter, rather than the former category. 10
10 2
Polygamy was, and remained, a crime contrary to social normalcy.
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Waite stated that "[p]olygamy has
always been odious among the northern and western nations of Europe,
and, until the establishment of the Mormon Church, was almost
exclusively a feature of the life of Asiatic and of African people."' 1 3 The
Court further noted that second marriages were always void at common
law. 10 4 Furthermore, polygamy was once punishable by death in England
and Wales. 10 5 Although the harsh punishment of execution did not carry
over into America, the Court explained that polygamy has always been a
punishable offense in our nation.10 6 Therefore, the Court wrote that it
would defy logic to suggest that the enactment of the First Amendment

96

See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 161-62.

97 See id. at 162.
98 See id.

99 The Court undertook this examination of history because the word "religion" is not
defined in the Constitution; this made an historical analysis the appropriate method of
determining the true meaning of the First Amendment. See id.at 162-66.
'oo Id. at 164.
101 See id. at 164-65.
102 See id at 165-66.
103 Id. at 164.
104 Id at 164-65 (adding that polygamy cases were tried most often in the ecclesiastical
courts to preserve the separation of the ecclesiastical courts from the civil courts).
105 Id. at 165 (noting that it was these same statutes that were modified and reenacted in the

American colonies).
106 See id ("[W]e think it may safely be said there never has been a time in any State of the
Union when polygamy has not been an offence against society, cognizable by the civil courts and
punishable with more or less severity.").
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was intended to put a stop to the prohibition of polygamy-instantly
10 7
transforming it from a social evil into a religious right.
Accordingly, the Court discussed the important role that marriage
plays in the social order. Marriage is the cornerstone of society.) 8 It 0is9
not only a "sacred obligation," but also a civil contract governed by law.'
Out of marriage grows "social relations and social obligations and duties,
with which government is necessarily required to deal."' 10 To this end, the
Court observed that it is the rightful job of a government to maintain the
Thus, Congress's proscription of polygamy was a
social order."'
legitimate exercise of its governmental authority.
The Court added that to permit Reynolds and others to exempt
themselves from the Morrill Act on the basis of their religious practice of
polygamy would be inconsistent with the our nation's system of freedom
of religion as established. "Laws are made for the government of actions,
and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions,
they may with practices." ' 1 2 To allow Reynolds to circumvent the Act's
mandate would essentially make him above the law.' 13 "Government
could exist only in name under such circumstances. '1 14 Therefore, because
Reynolds knowingly entered into a plural marriage, 1 5 the Court 6sustained
1
his conviction and upheld Congress's prohibition on polygamy.
107

See id. ("In the face of all this evidence, it is impossible to believe that the constitutional

guaranty of religious freedom was intended to prohibit legislation in respect to this most
important feature of social life.").
108See id. (commenting that "society may be said to be built" upon marriage).
109 Id.
110

Id.

111See id. at 166. The Court reasoned as follows:
An exceptional colony of polygamists under an exceptional leadership may sometimes
exist for a time without appearing to disturb the social condition of the people who
surround it; but there cannot be a doubt that, unless restricted by some form of
constitution, it is within the legitimate scope of the power of every civil government to
determine whether polygamy or monogamy shall be the law of social life under its
dominion.
Id.
112 Id.
"3 See id.at 166-67 ("To permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious
belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto
himself.").
114Id. at 167.
115 The Court went into some detail in examining Reynolds' mens rea in committing the
crime of polygamy. In sum, it concluded that all of Reynolds' actions were undertaken
knowingly, thus his conviction was justified under basic criminal law principles. See id.
(observing that no case has gone as far as to allow those whose conduct consisted entirely of
positive criminal acts to escape punishment merely "because he religiously believed the law
which he had broken ought never to have been made").
116

id.
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There have been countless cases regarding the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clause since Reynolds, 1 7 but the Supreme Court has never
revisited polygamy in light of contemporary precedent. Thus, Reynolds
remains a significant hurdle to litigants challenging anti-polygamy statutes.
The next section examines whether last year's Lawrence decision lowered
this hurdle.

II. A COURT DIVIDED: THE LANDMARK LA WRENCE V. TEx4S DECISION
This section will recount the Supreme Court's June 2003 decision in
Lawrence v. Texas.' 18 The author will review and analyze the majority and
dissenting opinions in Lawrence119 as they may or may not arise in a
challenge to a polygamy prohibition. Justice Scalia and many legal
commentators feel as if Lawrence radically limits the rights of legislatures
to base legislation, in part or in whole, on any moralistic reasoning.' 20 It
remains to be seen whether anti-polygamy statutes are vulnerable to attack
on this premise.
A. The Facts Giving Rise to Litigation
Petitioners John Geddes Lawrence and Tyron Garner were arrested

upon the arrival of local police to their private residence.' 21 The police
were responding to a weapons disturbance, but instead observed the two
men engaging in homosexual acts. 122 The men were charged under a
Texas statute criminalizing homosexual sodomy. 23 At trial in the Harris
County Criminal Court, the men challenged the statute as violative of the
Constitution's Equal Protection Clause. 124 This challenge was rejected,

117 See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520
(1993) (holding that licensing, inspection and zoning approvals to establish a church, including a
ritual of animal sacrifice, violated the Free Exercise Clause).
118 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
119 Justice Clarence Thomas' brief dissenting opinion will not be discussed in this Note. In
short, Justice Thomas reasoned that the Texas law was foolish, but within the state legislature's
power to enact. He noted that, if given the chance, he would vote to repeal the statute. See id. at
605 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
120 See discussion infra Part II.C.
121 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 563.
122See id. ("The right of the police to enter does not seem to have been questioned.").
123 The applicable state law mandated that "[a] person commits an offense if he engages in

deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §
21.06(a) (Vernon 2003). The statute then defined "deviate sexual intercourse" as the following:
"(A) any contact between any part of the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another
person; or (B) the penetration of the genitals or the anus of another person with an object." Id. §
21.01(1).
124 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 563.
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and the two men eventually plead no contest to the charges. 125 Upon
appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Texas Fourteenth District affirmed the
The appellate court considered the
lower court's decision. 126
constitutionality of the statute under the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and concluded there was no
constitutional violation. 127 The court found the Supreme Court's 1986
decision in Bowers v. Hardwick128 to be dispositive of petitioners' due
The Supreme Court granted certiorari,
process privacy claims. 129
in light of the due process claims
whereupon it considered the case only
30
and revisited its holding in Bowers.'
B. Flagrantly Vague? The Lawrence Majority
In the majority opinion, Justice Anthony Kennedy noted that the
Court granted certiorari to consider three questions: (1) whether the Texas
statute violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment;
(2) whether the notions of liberty and privacy embodied in the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause were violated by petitioners'
3
convictions; and (3) whether Bowers v. Hardwick should be overruled.1 '
due process
The Court, however, decided the case solely on substantive
32
grounds, thus avoiding petitioners' equal protection claims.
If the Court had decided the case on equal protection grounds, it
would not likely have been cited in J. Bronson, D. Cook, and G. Lee
Cook's complaint.' 33 This is because judicial recognition of homosexuals
as a protected class would not be relevant to a potential liberty interest of
Mormons to practice polygamy. Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion
took the equal protection route; she would have invalidated the statute as
homosexuals
and
discriminating
between
unconstitutionally

125
126

id.
See Lawrence v. Texas, 41 S.W.3d 349, 362 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001), rev'd, 539 U.S. 558

(2003).
27 See id. at 350-59.
128

478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).

129 See Lawrence, 41 S.W.3d at 359-62 (looking also to historical proscription of sodomy

as a justification for the state's right to prohibit conduct based upon its legislature's notion of
privacy). The court concluded that "we find no constitutional 'zone of privacy' shielding
homosexual conduct from state interference." Id. at 362.
130 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564.
131 id.
132 See id. ("[This] case should be resolved by determining whether the petitioners were free
as adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.").
133 See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
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heterosexuals. 134 Nonetheless, the majority decided the case exclusively
on substantive due process grounds. Notwithstanding the fact that there
likely may not have been a majority had the case been decided on equal
protection principles,' 35 the majority's choice to frame the issue as one of
liberty protected by due process may very well have been a dangerous
proposition. 36

Justice Kennedy began the majority opinion by breaking down the
seminal Supreme Court cases decided on substantive due process and
right-to-privacy grounds. Noting that the Court has defined broadly the
scope of liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, 3 7 Justice
38
Kennedy looked first to Griswold v. Connecticut.1
In Griswold, the
Court recognized the "right to make certain decisions regarding sexual
conduct extends beyond the marital relationship.' 3 9 Justice Kennedy then
went on to consider Eisenstadt v. Baird,140 where the Court reasoned that
"[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear
or beget a child.' 4 1 These past cases certainly do not speak to polygamy,
but it seems that a necessary corollary of their pronouncements is that
decisions about marriage are worthy of even more protection than other
personal choices. This
sentiment is bolstered by other leading cases
42
dealing with marriage. 1

134 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579-85 (O'Connor, J., concurring). O'Connor noted that

"Texas cannot assert any legitimate state interest here, such as national security or preserving the
traditional institution of marriage." Id. at 585.
135 See Jerry Elmer, A Victory for Gay Rights in Lawrence v. Texas, 52 R.I. B.J.
5, 37
(2003) (observing that "the Court was explicit in explaining that the reason it chose not to rely
on equal protection is that then Georgia-style anti-sodomy laws would not come within the ambit
of the decision.").
136 See James W. Paulsen, The Significance of Lawrence v. Texas, 41 HOUS. LAW.
32, 37,
38 (2004) (commenting that "the Court's decision to frame the issue as protecting an individual's
liberty to engage in private conduct free from state intervention creates a ruling that sweeps
broadly" and that "it is hard not to come away with the impression that ... Lawrence's effects
will likely ripple across the nation for years to come").
137 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564-65.
138 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
139 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565.
140 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
141 Id. at 453.
142 See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (overturning severe restrictions
placed on
inmate marriages and stating that prison officials must have strong reasons before limiting
inmates' rights to marry); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (reasoning that depriving
citizens the right to marry based upon race "is surely to deprive all the State's citizens of liberty
without due process of law.").
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Nonetheless, it is the Court's examination and overruling of Bowers
where polygamists can potentially gain the most ammunition from
Lawrence's majority opinion. In sum, Bowers upheld a Georgia statute
that criminalized both heterosexual and homosexual sodomy. 143 In
Bowers, the justices framed the issue as whether or not there was a
fundamental right to engage in sodomy. 144 The Lawrence majority noted
that framing the issue in that manner was incorrect, because it "disclose[d]
the Court's own failure to appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake. ' 45
The Court then re-examined46 the issues of Bowers and overruled the
seventeen-year-old decision. 1
In examining Bowers, Justice Kennedy seemingly chose to look at the
case's big picture rather than scrutinize the Court's prior reasoning.
Justice Kennedy's opinion looked more to the positive rights of
homosexuals rather than to the states' ability to infringe upon their
freedoms. 147 He viewed the liberty interests at stake more as the right of
people to engage in their own private relationships. Granted, much of
Justice Kennedy's opinion is phrased in terms of sexual relations, which
does not necessarily equate with marriage, 148 but his words acknowledged
unequivocally that states should go to great lengths to avoid interfering
with a citizen's personal sphere of liberty rights.
In that respect, Justice Kennedy wrote: "The issue is whether the
majority may use the power of the State to enforce [its moral] views on the
whole society through operation of the criminal law. 'Our obligation is to
define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code."",149 In light
of the Court's eventual holding, this is truly expansive language.
Arguably, it can be used to undermine any legislature's attempt to
143

See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas,

539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (reasoning that "[t]he law ... is constantly based on notions of
morality, and if all laws representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated under the
Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed.").
144 Id. at 190 ("The issue presented is whether the Federal Constitution confers a
fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of the
many States that still make such conduct illegal and have done so for a very long time.").
145 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 566-67 (explaining that the manner in which the Bowers
Court framed the issue "demeans the claim the individual put forward").
146 See id. at 566-79. In overruling Bowers, the Court stated that "Bowers was not correct
when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers
v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled." Id. at 578.
147 See, e.g., id. at 567 (emphasizing that the petitioners' behavior deserves protection,
because it involves private, sexual conduct that is generally superior to a state's interest).
148 See id. (commenting that "it would demean a married couple were it to be said marriage
is simply about the right to have sexual intercourse").
149 See id. at 571 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
850 (1992)).
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influence its processes with moral justifications for certain enactments. 150
To this end, Justice Kennedy reviewed the extensive history of sodomy
prohibitions, and the more recent trend of repealing such statutes, both
domestically and worldwide. 15 He further noted that there was no
longstanding American tradition of laws aimed at homosexuality; rather,
any laws that remained on the books were rarely enforced.
Moreover, subsequent Supreme Court precedent had diminished
Bowers' effect such that stare decisis' strong, but flexible, command could
be circumvented.1 52 Of particular relevance to this Note was Planned
Parenthoodof Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.153 In Casey, the Court
reasoned that the substantive component of the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause provides each citizen with a realm of personal
autonomy in which the government should not meddle.' 54 Much to the
dismay of commentators, 55 and much to the pleasure of polygamists
seeking potential constitutional protection for plural marriage, Justice
Kennedy quoted extensively from Casey. Specifically, he looked to
Casey's famed "sweet-mystery-of-life" passage. 56 That passage reads as
follows:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person
may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of

150See Sherry F. Colb, Welcoming Gay People Back into the Fold: The Supreme Court
Overrules Bowers v. Hardwick, FINDLAW's LEGAL COMMENTARY, at http://writ.news.findlaw.
com/colb/20030630.html (June 30, 2003) ("[Lawrence] calls into question the State's role as
enforcer of morality and suggests that where no one is harmed, decisions must usually be left in
the hands of the individual. Though the majority might not be willing to take the principle to its
logical conclusion at the moment, some Court might do so in the future.").
151See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 568-71.
152For example, in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), the Court held that an
amendment to Colorado's Constitution that made it unlawful to protect gays as a defined class
was unconstitutional and could not survive even rational basis review. Id. at 635-36.
153 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
154See id at 847 ("It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty
which the government may not enter. We have vindicated this principle before.").
155See, e.g., Gary D. Allison, Sanctioning Sodomy: The Supreme Court Liberates Gay Sex
and Limits State Power to Vindicate the Moral Sentiments of the People, 39 TULSA L. REv. 95,
142-45 (2003) (extensively critiquing the Court's decision and noting that the Court rather
boldly employed Casey's "sweet-mystery-of-life" passage, which was developed in the abortion
context, to apply to homosexual sex).
156See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 588 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (mocking the majority's reliance
on this passage and labeling it dictum).
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human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes
of
57
personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.1
This is sweeping, powerful language, and Justice Kennedy's
quotation of the text seems to reinforce its current vitality. The Court's use
of this language not only aids polygamists in their struggle to declare state
prohibitions on polygamy unconstitutional, it arguably aids all litigants
seeking to shield any asserted interest under the guise of the right to
privacy.
In deeming the statute unconstitutional, Justice Kennedy concluded
that "[h]ad those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components of
liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might have been more specific.
'
They did not presume to have this insight."158
This, again, is broad
language that can possibly be used by polygamists to argue their cause.
Justice Kennedy's other closing language, however, tempers the above to
some extent. As the majority opinion winded down, Justice Kennedy
finally began to tailor his words to the instant case's specific subject
matter. For example, Kennedy stressed that Texas was prohibiting two
adults from engaging in homosexual conduct within the privacy of their
own home. 159 This arguably narrows the scope of the decision.
According to Justice Scalia, however, the general import of the
majority opinion goes well beyond validating the petitioners' rights to
engage in homosexual sodomy. 160 It speaks to all morals-based legislation.
The next section looks at Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in the context
of polygamy challenges.

PlannedParenthood,505 U.S. at 851.
See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-79.
151 See id.at 578. Justice Kennedy's opinion reads in pertinent
part:
The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who might be
injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent might not easily
be refused. It does not involve public conduct or prostitution. It does not involve
whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that
homosexual persons seek to enter. The case does involve two adults who, with full and
mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual
lifestyle. The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot
demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct
157

158

a crime.
Id.
160

See id.at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining that "the Court makes no effort to cabin

the scope of its decision").
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C. One Angry Man: Scalia's Dissent
In his dissent, Justice Scalia voiced skepticism and criticism regarding
the majority's decision. 61 Scalia immediately lashed out against the
majority's refusal to declare homosexuality a fundamental right and their
unwillingness to subject the Texas statute to anything more than "an
unheard-of form of rational-basis review."' 62 Accordingly, Scalia quickly
revealed the theme of his dissent-the majority's
opinion "will have far163
reaching implications beyond this case."'
The conservative jurist that he is, Scalia seemed to be very critical of
the majority's approach to stare decisis. He accused the majority of
applying stare decisis in a "manipulative" manner, puppeteering through
past cases to reach its desired result.' 64 Thus, Scalia disapproved of the
majority citing Casey's "sweet-mystery-of-life" passage rather than citing
Casey's ultimate holding. 65 The majority's citation to this passage, wrote
Scalia, threw a shadow of doubt over the entire opinion and could have
future ramifications. 66 Casey's passage is abstract, aspirational prose. If
taken to the extreme, defining liberty as a citizen's "own concept of
existence" could strip the government of its power over our personal
lives, 167 including the right to enter into a plural marriage.
Scalia also critiqued the majority's willingness to dispense with the
proposition that the "governing majority's" moral beliefs are capable of
providing a rational basis for social legislation.' 68 Scalia listed a half
dozen past cases that cited Bowers and relied on the premise that it is
within the rightful power of the government to legislate based partly on

161 At least one commentator reveled in Scalia's dissent. See, e.g., Colb, supra note 150
("Almost as satisfying as the Court's recognition of how destructive and mean-spirited the
Hardwick decision was, is Justice Scalia's rage at its passing. One need only read the tone of his
dissent to know what a monumental event Lawrence v. Texas really is.").
162 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
163 See id.
'64 See id. at 587 ("I do not myself believe in rigid adherence to stare decisis in
constitutional cases; but I do believe that we should be consistent rather than manipulative in

invoking the doctrine.").
165 See id. at 588.
166 See id.
167There certainly are public aspects to marriage that seemingly extend beyond those
matters covered in Casey's "sweet-mystery-of-life" passage, but the personal nature of marriage

might be included in the passage's breadth. The public/private characterizations that can be used
in arguments distinguishing polygamy from homosexual sodomy will be discussed in Part III of
this Note.
168 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 589 (observing that "[c]ountless judicial decisions and legislative
enactments have relied on [this] ancient proposition").
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morality. 169 Thus, Scalia wrote the following controversial, headlinegrabbing passage:
State laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution,
masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity are likewise
sustainable only in light of Bowers' validation of laws based on moral
choices. Every single one of these laws is called into question by today's
decision; the Court makes no effort to cabin the scope of its decision to
exclude them from its holding. The impossibility of distinguishing
homosexuality from other traditional "morals" offenses is precisely why
Bowers rejected the rational-basis challenge ....
What a massive disruption of the current social order, therefore, the
overruling of Bowers entails.170
While it seems far-fetched to think that expanding the rights of
homosexuals will compel courts to declare unconstitutional bestiality and
similar statutes, Scalia makes a legitimate point.17 ' Granted it is often
difficult to separate the message from the messenger, but as Scalia noted,
the Lawrence majority seemingly withdrew morals-based legislation from
the government's inventory of permissible actions. States will now need to
look beyond traditional morals in enacting legislation. 172
Whether
polygamy statutes are susceptible to constitutional attack on this premise
will be discussed in the next section, but the argument can certainly be
made.
Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion further criticized the majority for
73
allegedly taking a result-oriented approach towards antisodomy laws.
Scalia lambasted the majority for relying on the notion that antisodomy
laws were rarely enforced "against consenting adults acting in private"
because according to the majority it is obvious that such conduct is very

169

See id. at 589-90. One case Scalia cited was Milner v. Apfel, 148 F.3d 812 (7th Cir.

1998), where the Seventh Circuit cited Bowers in noting that "[l]egislatures are permitted to
legislate with regard to morality rather than confined to preventing demonstrable harms." Id at
814 (citations omitted).
170 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 590-91 (citations omitted).
171 One would be hard-pressed to deny that states could not come up with plausible, nonmorals-based reasons, for prohibiting bestiality.
172 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577-78 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 217
(1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003))
("'[T]he fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice
as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice' ... Justice
Stevens' analysis. . . should control here.").
173 See id. at 596.
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unlikely to be prosecutable. 17 4 Scalia pointed out that, notwithstanding the
difficulty of building a case against a person engaging in homosexual
sodomy, over two hundred reported prosecutions have taken place. 75
Moreover, Scalia observed that, in contrast to the majority's assertions,
states have continually prosecuted adults acting in the privacy of their
homes "inmatters pertaining to sex.', 176 Were they not to prosecute such
crimes, child
pornography, incest, and prostitution would go
177
unpunished.
Scalia concluded his discussion of due process by reinforcing his
view that Texas' antisodomy statute is constitutional as supported by a
rational basis.178 "The Texas statute undeniably seeks to further the belief
of its citizens that certain forms of sexual behavior are 'immoral and
unacceptable.""1 79 The majority's decision to deem Texas' statute as
without a rational basis, wrote Scalia, essentially leaves states powerless.
Scalia proclaimed that "[t]his effectively decrees the end of all morals
legislation."' 80 Being that courts have viewed polygamy as "immoral" and
"barbaric," there is a justifiable question as to where polygamy statutes
stand after Lawrence.' 81 The next section considers this question.
III. Is LA WRENCE FATAL TO POLYGAMY PROHIBITIONS?
Much has and will be written on whether Lawrence was the death
knell of institutionalized discrimination against homosexuals in
America.182
This section, however, examines whether Lawrence's
mandate was powerful enough to overturn polygamy prohibitions on the

174 See id at 597 (stating sarcastically that "consensual sodomy.., is rarely performed on

stage").

115 Id. (adding that "[t]here are also records of 20 sodomy prosecutions and 4 executions
during the colonial period").
176 See id.
177 See id.at 598 ("In any event, an 'emerging awareness' is by definition not 'deeply

rooted in this Nation's history and tradition[s],' as we have said 'fundamental right' status
requires." (alteration in original)).
178 See id.at 599 ("[The] proposition [that Texas' statute has no rational basis] is so out of
accord with our jurisprudence-indeed, with the jurisprudence of any society we know-that it
requires little discussion.").
179Id. (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)).
180Id.
181 See Harmer-Dionne, supra note 69, at 1302.
182 See, e.g., Richard Brookhiser, Now That Sodomy is Legal, Is Gay Marriage Far
Behind?, N.Y. OBSERVER, July 28, 2003, at 1; David L. Hudson, Jr., Court Won't Tie Lawrence
to Gay Adoption Law, 3 No. 5 ABA J. E-REP., Feb. 6, 2004, at 1; Tony Mauro, Double-Edged
Ruling: Lawrence v. Texas a Boon For Gay Rights - Or is it?, THE RECORDER, Feb. 9, 2004, at
1.
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basis that they violate polygamists' right to privacy. By making several
key distinctions between the right to enter into a polygamous marriage and
other freedoms protected under the guise of the right to privacy, this
section concludes that Lawrence may not be the springboard Justice
Scalia's dissent claimed. Polygamy is distinct from homosexual sodomy
and is sufficiently justified on non-morals-based reasoning such that the
status quo is likely to carry forward.
A. Outlawing Polygamy as a Moral Prohibition
To argue that America's polygamy prohibitions were not put into
place based on moral principles would be an exercise in futility. The
majority of nineteenth century Americans opposed the practice. 183 In fact,
they condemned it. "[O]pponents [of polygamy] believed that traditional
monogamy was necessary to the survival of decent civilization. They
associated polygamy not with love, but with uncontrolled and unnatural
lust.' ' 18 4 Therefore, Congress enacted several pieces of legislation to
counteract this perceived moral predicament.1 85 Most noteworthy is the
Morrill Act, which outlawed polygamy in all of the Territories.' 86 Though
challenged on free exercise grounds, the Supreme Court's language in
upholding the Act confirmed that polygamy prohibitions were in part
morals-based. 187 Chief Justice Waite's majority opinion in Reynolds v.
United States essentially belittled polygamy-noting, among other things,
that "[p]olygamy has always been odious among the northern and western
nations of Europe, and, until the establishment of the Mormon Church, was
' 88
almost exclusively a feature of the life of Asiatic and of African people."'
Even a cursory glimpse at the Reynolds decision reveals the moral
undertones in the Court's reasoning;89 the Court undoubtedly treated
polygamy as immoral, uncivil conduct.'
Thus, if courts interpret Lawrence as expansively as the text arguably
reads, polygamy prohibitions may be in hot water. The Lawrence majority
dispensed with Bowers and did an about-face on the issue of whether states

183 See David L. Chambers, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage,26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 53,
61-65 (1997).
184Id. at 64. See generally Sarah Barringer Gordon, "The Liberty of Self-Degradation
Polygamy, Woman Suffrage, and Consent in Nineteenth Century America, 83 J. AM. HIST. 815
(1996) (discussing public opinion on nineteenth century Mormon women).
185 See supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
"86 The Morrill Act, § 1, Pub. L. No. 37-126, 12 Stat. 501, 501 (1862) (repealed 1910).
187 See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162, 164 (1878).
188 Id. at 164.
'89 See Kincaid, supra note 64, at 85 (stating that the Reynolds Court "held that rights
abuses could be determined by standards found in prevailing practices and customary norms").
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can use the power of the majority to instill moral views on all of society.' 90
Lawrence says morality should play no part in determining the scope of
liberty under the Due Process Clause.' 9' In enacting the Morrill Act,

Congress specifically targeted the religious views of the Mormons, 192 as
evidenced by the Act's mandates.' 93 Moral and religious views, however,
are often so intertwined that they are virtually indistinguishable.
Therefore, moral views alone cannot substantiate prohibiting polygamy.
Nonetheless, sufficient external justification exists such that polygamy
prohibitions appear to be safe for the time being. The next section
examines several of these non-morals-based rationales for upholding
polygamy.
B. Why the Right to Privacy Can be Expanded Without Compromising the
Ability to ProscribePolygamy
Justice Scalia was quick to predict that Lawrence would lead to the
elimination of all morals-based legislation. 194 Arguably, though, very few
pieces of legislation are supportable by looking only to the moral views of
the majority. Laws prohibiting prostitution, for example, can be sustained
on the basis of non-moralistic justifications. Prostitution involves more
than merely the ethical quandary of whether our society should permit the
exchange of sexual favors for money; prostitution laws are also premised
Similarly,
largely on safety concerns for the women involved.' 95
polygamy prohibitions can be justified on other-than-purely moralistic
reasons. The following will explain how.

190See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003).
191 See id. (explaining that the Court's "obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to
mandate [its] own moral code").
192 See Richard Collin Mangrum, Good News Club v. Milford Central School: Teaching
Morality From a Religious Perspective on School Premises After Hours, 35 CREIGHToN L. REV.
1023, 1037-38 (2002). Mangrum summarized the Act:
The Morrill Act, enacted in 1862, not only targeted the religious practice of polygamy,
but also the Mormon church's corporate structure and power. The second section of
the Act both revoked an 1855 act of the Utah Territorial Legislation incorporating the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints and annulled any territorial legislation that
countenanced polygamy. The third section was aimed at the economic power of the
Mormon church, prohibiting any religious or charitable organization in any territory
from holding real estate valued at more than $50,000.
Id.
193 See id.
194 See supra notes 160-81 and accompanying text.
195 See Marjorie E. Murphy, Book Review: A Question of Procurement:Not Prostitution, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 1075, 1076 (1987) (acknowledging public health and safety concerns "underlie
the prohibition against prostitution").
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1. Marriage is Not Sex: The Public/Private Distinction
Lawrence was first and foremost about the rights of consenting adults
to engage in homosexual conduct within the privacy of the home.1 96 The
protection of this liberty interest, which is sexual in nature, does not lead
inescapably to the conclusion that Americans must soon enjoy the right to
enter into plural marriages. Although courts must now look beyond
morality when ruling on legislation, the notion that protecting intimate
sexual conduct leads to wholesale marital freedom seems to be nothing
more than wishful thinking.
Marriage is generally regarded as a legal status, though often entered
into through religious ceremonies. 97 Marriage is more than the ability to
have sex with your spouse. Furthermore, despite the claims of many
opponents of same-sex marriages, 198 marriage is more than simply a
vehicle for procreation. Marriage-notwithstanding today's tremendous
public debates that may one day reshape our society's views-is about a
relationship between two people. With this relationship come certain
rights and responsibilities and a lifetime of commitment. To equate the
sexual intimacy discussed in Lawrence with marriage would be to demean
this venerated institution. At the heart of Lawrence was sex; it requires
way too many inferential leaps for Lawrence to speak to marriage. Courts
199
are unlikely to take such leaps.
196

See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (Kennedy, J.) ("The case does involve two adults who,

with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a
homosexual lifestyle.... Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full
right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government.").
197 See Marriage as Contract and Marriage as Partnership:
The Future of Antenuptial
Agreement Law, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2075, 2076 (2003). One commentator noted:
Historically, judicial opinions discussed marriage in purely public status terms,
emphasizing public-policy-driven state regulation of the institution of marriage and
focusing on the state's role in preserving and protecting the marital relationship. Two
more modem conceptions of marriage, however, treat it as a quasi-contract or as an
analogue to a commercial partnership.
Id.
198 As the debate over same-sex marriages rages on, one common
argument of opponents is
that marriage is largely about the potential to produce offspring. We will see how this debate
plays out, but with the onset of civil disobedience in issuing marriage licenses and a growing
public sentiment recognizing gay rights, permissible same-sex marriages may not be too far in
the distant future.
199But see Gillett, supra note 45, at 534 ("Laws restricting polygamy do not uphold the
sanctity of marriage.... The extra marriages do not cheapen the polygamists' respect for
marriage as an institution or their marital responsibilities."); Jeff Jacoby, Is Lawful Polygamy
Next?, TOWNHALL.COM, at http://www.townhall.com/columnists/jeffjacoby/printjj20040116.s
html (Jan. 16, 2004) (stating that if courts follow the Supreme Court in Lawrence and the
Massachusetts Supreme Court, then "the damage inflicted on marriage as we know it-indeed,
on the social order as we know it-will be considerable").
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Sexual intercourse, as most people understand it, is a private matter
that takes place between consenting adults in the bedroom. It is the most
intimate behavior in which the citizenry engages. Lawrence spoke to this
discreet, personal activity. Marriage, on the other hand, includes both
public and private conduct. Within the privacy of the home, marriage
means essentially whatever the married individuals wish it to mean.
Nonetheless, marriage extends beyond the confines of the home to our
society. It is a relationship created by the laws of the state. 20' With a
marriage flow significant benefits from the state,20 1 including public
recognition of the relationship. Intimate sexual activity simply does not
correspond to marriage on this level. The sole logical reading of Lawrence
is that the "autonomy of self' that the majority attempted to reinforce
speaks to private sexual conduct rather than marriage, which encompasses
both a public and private dynamic.20 2
2. Polygamy Prohibitions as Regulating the Secondary Effects of Plural
Marriage
Anti-polygamy statutes can be rooted on much more than outlawing a
tenet of fundamental Mormonism or preserving the traditional paradigm of
what constitutes a marriage. There are numerous external reasons for
forbidding a person from entering into a plural marriage. This section
documents some of the noteworthy, non-moralistic bases upon which antipolygamy statutes can be grounded. The author does not maintain that this
list is exhaustive. Rather, it is illustrative of proof to which legislative
bodies can point in justifying prohibitions on polygamy. This section
relies largely on evidence concerning fundamentalist Mormon activity in
Utah.
a. Anti-polygamy Statutes as Vehicles for Child Protection
Prohibitions on polygamy can be grounded on a state's desire to
safeguard children. This logic is twofold: states want to protect children
from being forced into polygamous marriages, and states also want to
protect children born of these marriages.

20o See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-7 (1998) (requiring marriage licenses); id. § 30-1-1
(voiding incestuous marriages); id. § 30-1-2.2 (validating all interracial marriages).
201 These benefits include, among countless other things, inheritance
rights, the ability to
sue on behalf of your spouse, and tax incentives.
202 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562
(2003).
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i.Teenage Wives
203
In some communities, male
Polygamous wives are often teenagers.
polygamists "consistently marry [girls] between the ages of fourteen and

sixteen.

20 4

Often, the age disparity between husband and wife is upward

of twenty years or greater.20 5 Religious leaders and family members often
fix these marriages. 20 6 Romantic initiation of polygamous relationships is
the exception rather than the norm. 20 7 This coercion deprives these young
women of both their independence and their childhood. In the name of

religion, older men take advantage of these teenage girls, placing
tremendous pressure on them. 0 8 Moreover, even when a polygamous
marriage is authorized-insofar as it is the husband's first marriage-the
parental consent needed to issue a marriage license to a couple that
includes an underage girl is often given without taking into consideration
the young girls' feelings.20 9
The above brings to light the issue of statutory rape. Many argue that
statutory rape is prevalent in Mormon polygamy. 2 10 Teenage girls are
often unaware such laws exist 2 1 and regardless, fear violent retribution

203 See Strassberg, supra note 74, at 366 (explaining that teenage plural wives are a reality
of polygamy).
204

Id.

205

Id.
See id. at 366 ("At most, there may be a 'brief, business-like... courtship' after the

206

older potential husband has been approved for polygymous marriage by the religious hierarchy
and by the girl's father.") (quoting D. MICHAEL QUINN, Plural Marriage and Mormon
Fundamentalism, in FUNDAMENTALISMS AND SOCIETY 257-58 (Martin E. Marty & R. Scott
Appleby eds., Univ. Chicago Press 1993)).
207 See id. at 366-67 (commenting that such marriages "are rarely, if ever, the result
of a
naturally developing romantic relationship between peers").
208 See id. at 366-68 (describing classic stories about teenage plural wives).
209 See id. at 381-89 (concluding that teenage female consent is artificial and more of a
result of religious pressure from the community and parental demands, rather than from
autonomous deliberation). One interesting topic Strassberg discusses is the complex dynamics
involved in the teenage female's decision-making process. See, e.g., id.at 385 (discussing the
role of impending motherhood in teenager's consent to enter into plural marriages). Although the
author relies extensively on Strassberg's work, other commentators criticize Strassberg for
emphasizing the negative aspects of polygamy. See, e.g., Chambers, supra note 183, at 81 ("To
my reading, the actual experiences of American men and women in plural marriages seems more
complex and less sinister than Strassberg portrays them .... I wish that... Strassberg, whose
work I admire, had approached [her] inquiry into polygamy more open-mindedly and
sympathetically.").
210 See Strassberg, supra note 74, at 377-81.
211 See Egan, supra note 49, at 54-55 (quoting a former plural wife as stating, "I was in my
late 20's before I even knew there was a law against statutory rape ....When I finally got out, at
age 28, I had the knowledge of the outside word of an 11-year-old.").
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should they protest. 21 2 This is compounded by the isolationism of
polygamous communities.21 3 Crimes are harder to police in such
communities. 21t Furthermore, incest and child abuse are said to be
common among Mormon fundamentalists. 21 5 This is due both to the
aforementioned isolationism and to a general absence of disdain for these
wicked practices in certain segments of the Mormon community. One
former polygamist wife proclaimed that polygamy is tantamount to
"organized crime, operating under the cover of religion." 2 6 Therefore,
polygamy must be within the power of the government to regulate.
Moreover, section III.B.2.b. of this Note, infra, will discuss additional
problems associated with wives of all plural marriages-regardless of a
woman's age upon entering the marriage.
ii. Children of Polygamous Marriages
Clearly, children born of plural marriages are raised in an
environment where young women are subject to the conduct described
above. All children of plural marriages, however, are potentially damaged
in many other ways by virtue of their being born and raised by polygamous
parents. Arguably, they are raised in an environment that "denies [them]
their rights." 21 7 Often these children grow up without the presence of a

212 Granted, many polygamous men could avoid statutory rape laws if they
were able to
obtain a state license prior to their marriages. See Strassberg, supra note 74, at 378 (stating that
"sexual relations in the context of a valid marriage to a minor is a defense to what otherwise
would be statutory rape").
213 Because they are set apart from mainstream society, many polygamist communities
are
able to evade governmental oversight. See id. at 405-412. Strassberg summarized this notion in
pertinent part:
The survival and growth of both polygyny and associated theocracies inevitably
require a diversion of resources from the secular government and society. With these
resources, religious institutions have the ability to create a small-scale theocratic
kingdom within the state. They can insulate themselves from general government
oversight and control by buying isolated tracts of land large enough to support an
entire community, owning community businesses that provide employment, privately
duplicating state services such as schools, and buying political power and protection
for their theocracy.
Id. at 409.
214 See id.at 410 (describing the characteristics of Mormon communities).
215 See, e.g., WIN News, Polygamy Practiced by Mormons and Tolerated in Utah, 24

LEXINGTON 77, 77 (1998) (discussing crimes associated with Mormon polygamy).
216 See Egan, supranote 49, at 52 (examining the plight of polygamy "survivors").
217 See Forbes, supra note 77, at 1544-45 (explaining that opponents
of polygamy believe
that "when a teenage girl marries an older man, she is essentially being killed off and deprived of
a normal childhood"). But see Gillett, supra note 45, at 534 (arguing that anti-polygamy statutes
do not protect children because prosecutions remove fathers from their lives).
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father and are raised largely by an overwhelmed mother.21 8 Insufficient
financial support frequently becomes an issue. 2 19 This takes the form of a
general deficiency of funds, as well as non-payment of child support.22 °
Additionally, in some fundamentalist Mormon communities, children are
housed in structures resembling "half-finished motels or dormitories. 2 21
These living conditions do not bode well for children's emotional wellbeing.222
One academic anthropologic study of Arab-Israeli adolescents born of
polygamous marriages documented significant mental health problems
associated with polygamous families.223 Granted, Muslim polygamy does
not wholly equate with Mormon polygamy, but the results of the study
remain disturbing. 4 It was documented that "husbands often favor the
junior wife and accord her and her children greater levels of economic and
social support., 225 This situation, perhaps the epitome of a dysfunctional
family, was shown to significantly affect the self-esteem and mental well
being of the children. 226 These children demonstrated greater levels of
218But see Forbes, supra note 77, at 1544 ("Polygamous family life provides a very
effective social re-enforcement for children. Having multiple wives allows for increased
supervision of young children. It is a mother's duty to nurture her children, and fundamentalist
women make that a primary goal each day.").
219 Money also factors into a different argument opposing polygamy. Some proponents fear
that legalizing polygamy will allow wealthy men a monopoly on wives and prohibit poor men
from attracting wives. See Chambers, supra note 183, at 82 (arguing that this scenario is
conceivable but unlikely because polygamy will likely never become the norm).
220 See Strassberg, supra note 74, at 408-09 (noting that the illegal and thus unlicensed
nature of polygamy hinders states from forcing fathers to pay paternity payments).
221See Egan, supra note 49, at 54 (discussing the Hillsdale and Colorado City
communities).
222The reproduction rate of polygamous families is consistently increasing, yet the best
interests of the children seem to be consistently ignored. See id.(explaining that the reproduction
rate allows one town's population to increase by ten percent annually and noting that husbands
will not allow their wives to use birth control); see also supra note 64 (describing the Mormons'
rate of growth).
223See generally Alean A1-Krenawi et al., Mental Health Aspects of Arab-Israeli
Adolescents From Polygamous Versus Monogamous Families, 142 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 446 (2002)
(undertaking a comparative study of 101 Arab Muslim adolescents from polygamous and
monogamous families).
224See id. at 448 ("[lI]t is essential to note that Islam allows a man to marry upwards of four
wives, under several preconditions. He must possess sufficient financial resources to support all
wives and their children; treatment, support, love, and attention accorded each wife must be
symmetrical ....
");see also Valerie Richardson, Two Many Wives, INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, May
7, 2001, at 32 (recounting the tale of Mormon Rulan Jeffs who is said to have at least sixty
wives, some of whom are an astounding seventy years younger than he).
225AI-Krenawi, supra note 223, at 456.
226See id. ("Such problematic maternal psychosocial dynamics... may adversely influence
adolescents' self-identity, self-esteem, and psychological well-being."). But see Forbes, supra
note 77, at 1546 ("[M]any children thrive in polygamous families. Children are never without a
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depression than children from monogamous families.22 7 Significant
familial tension arose from the inter-family dynamic, and, notably, these
children displayed lower levels of academic success. 228 Of course, these
results cannot be altogether generalized to American children in
polygamous families. Nonetheless, they should not be ignored. The
United States goes to great lengths to protect the rights of its children.229
Children born of polygamous marriages have no choice in the matter.230
The government, on the other hand, has the choice not to sanction the
installation of children into such circumstances.
b. The Effects ofPluralMarriageon the Myriad of Wives

The evidence is abundant that fundamentalist Mormon polygamy is
potentially physically and emotionally damaging to women. 23 There are
always two sides to every story,2 32 but tales of emotional abuse are quite
prevalent. 3 3 Once in a plural marriage, many endure "an experience of
complete exploitation: sexual, emotional, reproductive, and economic. '234
Sex is demanded of polygamous wives. 35 Intercourse is frequently the
play group and might not face some of the ordinary social problems that children in mainstream
society face. Children of polygamous families build strong bonds with their sisters and brothers,
and with other polygamous children.").
227 See AI-Krenawi, supra note 223, at 457 (noting that these results
were "not surprising in
light of potential family tensions, hostility, and miscommunication, as well as lower levels of
self-esteem, perceived academic achievement, and perceived parental support").
228 See id (recognizing the limited sampling of adolescents from polygamous
families in

the study).

229 It does not seem to be a stretch to say that the protection of children is
a paramount
concern in our government. There are countless examples of this, one being the truly remarkable
American public education system-at all levels of schooling-as compared to other nations.
230 Of course, no children have a choice as to who their parents are. Nonetheless, it seems

the state should take all reasonable measures to ensure the well being of children. Arguably,
anti-polygamy statutes are one such measure.
31 See generally Sandra Dallas, Polygamy's Victims Find Their Voice, BUS. WK, Sept.
11,
2000, at 4 (noting that former plural wives say the practice of polygamy is "fundamentally
degrading and rife with rape, incest, and abuse.").
232 See, e.g., Richardson, supra note 224, at 30 (discussing the
success of fundamental
Mormon Dr. Jerry Thompson, who has two wives, professional success, and family happiness).
Richardson also provided some insight into a male polygamist's psyche. See id. at 33
("Thompson would be the first to attest that the life of a polygamist husband is not the erotic
fantasy it's cracked up to be. Balancing the emotional needs of two wives and dealing with their
inherent jealousies and insecurities is more taxing than most men realize .... ").
233 See, e.g., Dallas, supra note 231, at 4 (describing the saga of Kaziah M. Hancock, who
struggled to escape from an abusive Mormon polygamous marriage).
214 Strassberg, supranote 74, at 395-96.
211 See, e.g., id. at 366-68 (recounting the story of Mary Ann Kingston,
a sixteen-year-old
girl who was forced to sexually consummate her arranged polygynous marriage to her thirty-twoyear-old uncle); see also Egan, supra note 49, at 54 (discussing the introduction of Viagra in the
Mormon community).
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result of threats and coercion.23 6 In many respects, the relationship evolves
into something akin to slavery.237 Often, wives find themselves unable to
deal with the reality of their husbands' other wives.2 38 The sentiment that
they are unable to escape the relationship once entering in to it only makes
things worse.239 Women feel trapped due to, among other things, their
many children and their financial dependence on the benevolence inherent
in polygamous communities. 240 This is compounded by Mormon doctrine
that condemns wives for leaving their families. 241 Thus, polygamy
potentially sentences women to a lifetime of emotional uncertainty and
despair.
In light of the above, many commentators decry polygamy as
sanctioning the subordination of women.24 2 There is not as much evidence
243
of this subordination in contemporary Mormon polygamy as in the past;

nonetheless, polygamous wives remain inferior to their husbands. They

236 See Strassberg, supra note 74, at 377-81.
237

See Gordon, supra note 36, at 764-71 (analytical comparison of polygamy and slavery);

see also Kincaid, supra note 64, at 82 (discussing the intersection of the anti-polygamy and
antislavery movements and noting that Harriet Beecher Stowe "became an ardent" opponent of
polygamy).
238 See Strassberg, supra note 74, at 395-96. Strassberg described this phenomenon
of
jealousy:
One reality 'survivors' of polygyny found that they were unprepared for was the
emotional devastation caused by sharing their husband with one or more women. It is
clear that these women entered plural marriages believing that their emotional need to
be loved by their husband would be met and that any jealousy of other wives could be
overcome by religious belief. They had a fantasy of a romantic marriage in which they
charitably shared their husband with a less fortunate woman who was not an emotional
threat. For these survivors, the reality of polygyny was sex without emotional
intimacy, intense loneliness and isolation, and feelings of jealousy that shook either
their faith in God or their sense of their own worthiness to God.
Id. at 395; see also J.E. Hulett, Jr., Social Role and PersonalSecurity in Mormon Polygamy, 45
AM. J. Soc. 542, 549-53 (1940) (examining the elements that produce insecurity in plural wives,
including "a very real danger that [they will] be refused a share in the husband's estate").
239 See Strassberg,supra note 74, at 400-05 ("[S]ignificant factors making it difficult for
some polygynous women to escape polygyny include rural isolation, ignorance of legal options,
and lack of economic opportunities and legal resources.").
240 See id.at 400-01 (commenting that "[i]t is difficult to understand whether this [fear of
losing their children is] based in practical reality or religious belief').
241

See id.at401.

242 There is widespread belief that polygamous marriages subordinate
the interests of

women to those of men. See generally Strassberg, supra note 74, at 394-402 (exploring the
victimization of women in polygamous marriages).
243 See James M. Donovan, Rock-Salting the Slippery Slope: Why Same-Sex Marriage is
Not a Commitment to Polygamous Marriage,29 N. Ky. L. REv. 521, 579-81 (2002) (discussing
the effect of women's voting rights in the social progress of polygamous women and explaining
why "[t]here is good reason to doubt that Mormon women view[] themselves as degraded,
especially as compared to their female contemporaries").
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are second-class citizens to the marriage. 244 To that end, one prominent
anti-polygamy advocacy group, formed by former polygamous wives,
counts the following as reprehensive characteristics of polygamous
marriages: "[m]ales are believed to have more rights and abilities than
females," "leadership is never shared," and women are "prohibit[ed]
[from] critical analysis and independent thinking., 245 Conduct that forces
such feelings onto state citizens appears to raise legitimate concerns upon
which the government can regulate intrastate relationships.
Granted, there is less of a justification for state interference in that
many women knowingly consent to enter into plural marriages.24 6 In this

situation, however, concerns about the authenticity of their consent as well
as for the eventual children of these marriages, must also be considered.24 7
In fact, legislatures should always look to the cumulative effect of all nonmoralistic reasons for prohibiting polygamy when enacting legislation. In
this respect, they should likewise consider possible reasons for outlawing
polygamy that are not examined in this Note, including the potential for
polygamists' abuse of U.S. taxation laws 248 and the dependence of
countless state laws on the monogamous marital relationship.249
CONCLUSION

It appears as if anti-polygamy statutes need not be overturned in light
of Lawrence. Justice Scalia, however, was correct to say that the
majority's opinion raises the threshold of legislative proof needed before
enacting legislation.
Moral reasons, unaccompanied by external
justifications, are no longer sufficient to maintain a state's right to
criminalize certain behavior.
Nonetheless, legitimate external
justifications exist to support polygamy statutes such that the status quo
will likely remain. Hopefully, however, the Supreme Court will perceive a
future challenge to polygamy prohibitions as an appropriate vehicle by
244 See A1-Krenawi, supra note 223, at 455-57 (discussing the deleterious effects of
polygamy on wives).
245 Tapestry Against Polygamy, DangerSigns of Abuse Within a PolygamousRelationship,
at http://www.polygamy.org/dangersigns.shtml (last visited Oct.2, 2004). Tapestry Against
Polygamy is at the frontlines of the battle against polygamy. See generally Richardson, supra
note 224, at 31-32 (discussing the evolution of Tapestry Against Polygamy as well as certain
cases that brought the group's cause into the spotlight).
246 See Strassberg, supra note 74, at 390-94 (discussing the large amount of adult women
who chose to convert to Mormonism later in life).
247 It is extremely difficult to say whose rights or which reasoning should trump
in this
situation. Thankfully, the issue is beyond the scope of this Note.
248 The author did not examine this because the evidence is largely anecdotal.
249 See, e.g., Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065, 1070 n.8 (10th Cir. 1985) (listing
nine
Utah laws that "are premised upon monogamy").
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which it can examine these statutes in light of both substantive due process
and the First Amendment's religion clauses.

